Michael Dobbs, author of One Minute to Midnight, provides a detailed step by step account of the Crisis on Twitter.  https://twitter.com/missilecrisis62

Everyone interested in the Cuban Missile Crisis should read One Minute to Midnight.

The Foreign Policy article he wrote can be found at: https://cubanmissilecrisis.foreignpolicy.com/blog/630847 and his New York Times article is at: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/16/opinion/the-eyeball-to-eyeball-myth-and-the-cuban-missile-crisiss-legacy.html?_r=0

This month of October 2012 marks fifty years since the Cuban Missile Crisis.  There are a number of conferences that examine the events of October 1962:

October 15, 2012 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1:00-2:30 pm

Is the World More Dangerous 50 years after the Cuban Missile Crisis?

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-world-more-dangerous-50-years-after-the-cuban-missile-crisis There will be a live webcast of this event.

October 17, 2012 Woodrow International Center for Scholars 3:30-5:00 pm

The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khruschev, and the Missiles of November

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-soviet-cuban-missile-crisis-castro-mikoyan-kennedy-khrushchev-and-the-missiles-november

October 18, 2012 National Archives McGowan Theater Noon

From the Vaults: The Cuban Missile Crisis  Films from the Archives holdings.

https://www.archives.gov/dc-metro/events/

October 23, 2012 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 4:00 pm-5:00 pm

Foreign Relations of the United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/foreign-relations-the-united-states-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis

October 24, 2012 Woodrow Wilson International center for Scholars 3:30 pm-5:00 pm

Cuban Missile Crisis: Nuclear Order of Battle

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/cuban-missile-crisis-nuclear-order-battle

October 25, 2012 Elliott School George Washington University 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm

The 50th Anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis: Lessons Learned

https://www.elliottschool.org/events/calendar.cfm?fuseaction=ViewMonthDetail&yr=2012&mon=10#1883

In the previous article a series of questions were posited with respect to North Korea’s intentions and goals.  Questions come before answers, or at least they should.  Upon  setting forth the fundamental questions the next step in the process is to establish a framework or construct that would enable one to interpret if not establish with certitude the political goals of the actor in question, in this case a nation-state. Upon reflection, this author has decided to recur to a terminology and methodology from a half-century ago, or so.. The term is brinkmanship, also occasionally spelled brinksmanship, and was apparently coined by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to describe a strategic approach to statecraft, manifested in particular incidents, during the Cold War with the USSR, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Brinkmanship may be a variation on the word gamesmanship and could be defined as going to the limit without actually going to war, done deliberately so as obtain a particular advantage, concession or outcome.  The goal is to make the opponent back off or back down especially by creating the impression that one is willing to, or is actually going to resort to even more extreme actions, including war. Escalation is a part of this as well.  A state that uses brinkmanship will often create a crisis.  Does this describe the North Korean approach to international relations?  If it does, have they been successful?  Is it possible to know if a state intended to go to war?  What would be the consequence of one side always backing down?